Central bank communication and interest rate rules
AbstractThe central bank's influence on private sector expectations is an important channel of monetary policy. Therefore, it is important for a central bank to pay attention to its communication. It should also be aware that the public might not be willing or able to process all the information that the central bank provides. In this paper, we explicitly take the public's information processing constraint into account when we design the interest rate rule. We find that if inflationary expectations are important relative to the output gap in determining current inflation, the central bank should be less activist when the public has a tighter information processing constraint.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Money Macro and Finance Research Group in its series Money Macro and Finance (MMF) Research Group Conference 2003 with number 44.
Date of creation: 27 Sep 2004
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Other versions of this item:
- M. Hoeberichts, 2003. "Central Bank Communication and Interest Rate Rules," WO Research Memoranda (discontinued) 729, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
- E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
- E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
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