Financing Competitive Asset Bids When Information is Asymmetric: The Role of Collateral as a Signal
AbstractIn this paper, borrowing agents require capital to finance competitive bids for a single productive asset rather than requiring capital for individual projects. Loan size is no longer effective as a signaling mechanism. Instead, high quality agents will either offer a sufficiently high level of collateral to signal their type or choose to pool with low quality agents. A pooling equilibrium will emerge if the implicit cost of signaling is too high but then high quality borrowers must bid against all borrowers rather than only their own type.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by The University of Melbourne in its series Department of Economics - Working Papers Series with number 662.
Length: 30 pages
Date of creation: 1998
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Department of Economics, The University of Melbourne, 5th Floor, Economics and Commerce Building, Victoria, 3010, Australia
Phone: +61 3 8344 5289
Fax: +61 3 8344 6899
Web page: http://www.economics.unimelb.edu.au
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CREDIT ; BORROWING ; ASYMETRIC INFORMATION;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- G10 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - General (includes Measurement and Data)
- G20 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - General
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