In the presence of demand uncertainty, a priori identical firms may voluntarily choose asynchronous timing of entries. We formulate a duopoly model where two firms compete during many marketing periods. To enter the market, each firm is required to make a long-term supply contract with retailers, which stipulates that the firm must supply a constant quantity each period. The state of demand is ex ante uncertain, and becomes observable a period after at least one firm's entry.
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Length: 23 pages Date of creation: 1998 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:mlb:wpaper:608
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