Using Reputation Costs in Non-Repeated Incentive Contracts

This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data

Using Reputation Costs in Non-Repeated Incentive Contracts

Author Info

Sherstyuk, K

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Katerina Sherstyuk

Abstract

In principal-agent models with moral hazard and limited liability, the principal may threaten the agent with reputaion damages in case of poor performance. We show that such reputation threats, although inefficient, often help the principal to discipline the agent.

Download Info
To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

Publisher Info
Paper provided by The University of Melbourne in its series Department of Economics - Working Papers Series with number 563.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length: 34 pages
Date of creation: 1997
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:mlb:wpaper:563

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Department of Economics, The University of Melbourne, 5th Floor, Economics and Commerce Building, Victoria, 3010, Australia
Phone: +61 3 8344 5289
Fax: +61 3 8344 6899
Email:
Web page: http://www.economics.unimelb.edu.au
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Colemann Leong).

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? Over five million full texts a year are downloaded through IDEAS.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-23.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.