On the Existence of Hagging and Posted Prices in the Presence of Shoppers
AbstractWe derive conditions under which all sellers bargain in (the Nash) equilibrium and yet other conditions under which all sellers post fixed prices. Some fraction of buyers have zero search costs but buyers are otherwise identical.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by The University of Melbourne in its series Department of Economics - Working Papers Series with number 513.
Length: 24 pages
Date of creation: 1996
Date of revision:
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Postal: Department of Economics, The University of Melbourne, 4th Floor, FBE Building, Level 4, 111 Barry Street. Victoria, 3010, Australia
Phone: +61 3 8344 5355
Fax: +61 3 8344 6899
Web page: http://www.economics.unimelb.edu.au
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D40 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - General
- E64 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Incomes Policy; Price Policy
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