Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Agency and communication problems in IMF conditional lending

Contents:

Author Info

  • Floriana Cerniglia

    ()

  • Laura Sabani
Registered author(s):

    Abstract

    The combination of special interest politics (agency problems) and informational asymmetries presents serious problems as the implementation of Fund conditionality is concerned. In this paper we focus on the role that the transmission of information between the IMF and the borrowing government has for the design of the most e??cient "incentive contract." Specifically, we find that when agency problems are especially severe, and/or IMF information is very valuable, a centralized control is indeed optimal (conventional conditionality). To the contrary, when local knowledge is more important than the agency bias we expect delegation (ownership) to be the optimal incentive scheme.

    Download Info

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
    File URL: http://dipeco.economia.unimib.it/repec/pdf/mibwpaper139.pdf
    File Function: First version, 2008
    Download Restriction: no

    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 139.

    as in new window
    Length: 30 pages
    Date of creation: Jun 2008
    Date of revision: Jun 2008
    Handle: RePEc:mib:wpaper:139

    Contact details of provider:
    Postal: Piazza Ateneo Nuovo, 1 Milano 20126
    Phone: +39 02 6448 3089
    Fax: +39 02 6448 3085
    Email:
    Web page: http://dipeco.economia.unimib.it
    More information through EDIRC

    Related research

    Keywords: IMF conditionality; delegation; communication;

    Find related papers by JEL classification:

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    References

    No references listed on IDEAS
    You can help add them by filling out this form.

    Citations

    Lists

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mib:wpaper:139. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Roberto Reale).

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.