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WP n. 8 - Resisting Globalization: Voting Power Indices and the National Interest in the EU Decision-making (E. Croci Angelini)

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Author Info
Elisabetta Croci Angelini (Università di Macerata) (Department of Studies on Economic Development (DiSSE), Macerata University)
Abstract

The European integration process can be regarded as an aspect of the overall process of globalization and at the same time as an attempt to reconcile the move towards standardization with the defence of national diversity. A central role in the effort to exploit the benefits of integration without hampering the national nterest is the collective decision-making process in the EU shared by the Council and the Parliament, where national representatives struggle for the conquest of the �lion�s share� in the division of the surplus stemming from the compromise on common policies. The paper focuses on the rationale behind the various Indices of Voting Power (Penrose, Banzhaf, Shapley and Shubik, Holler) which are the formal tools meant to understanding the coalition formation and assessing the probability of reaching an agreement. In the EU Council, although ministers tend to reach a broad consensus and explicit voting is rare, decision may be taken by qualified majority voting where countries are assigned weights reflecting their size. This practice has often been objected on the grounds that the potential emergence of permanent coalitions would prevent countries from being adequately represented, and eventually a different rule was proposed. The pros and cons of the newly proposed system are analysed through the computation of the Indices of Voting Power for the EU Council and Parliament.

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File URL: http://zope.unimc.it/dsse/RePEc/mcr/wpaper/wpaper8/doc
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Paper provided by Macerata University, Department of Studies on Economic Development (DiSSE) in its series Working Papers with number wpaper8.

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Date of creation: 30 May 2007
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Publication status: Published
Handle: RePEc:mcr:wpaper:wpaper8

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Related research
Keywords: cooperative games I-power voting power European integration swing P-power Power indices

Find related papers by JEL classification:
O1 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development
O11 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Macroeconomic Analyses of Economic Development

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This page was last updated on 2008-7-20.


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