Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Commons as a risk-management tool: theoretical predictions and an experimental test

Contents:

Author Info

  • Marielle Brunette

    ()
    (Laboratoire d'Economie Forestière, INRA - AgroParisTech)

  • Philippe Delacote

    (Laboratoire d'Economie Forestière, INRA - AgroParisTech
    Climate Economic Chair)

  • Serge Garcia

    (Laboratoire d'Economie Forestière, INRA - AgroParisTech)

  • Jean-Marc Rousselle

    (INRA, UMR 1135 LAMETA)

Abstract

The impact of the safety-net use of Common-pool resources (CPR) on the individual investment into and extraction from the commons is analyzed in this paper. Agents of the community first choose to invest in their private project and in the CPR; second, they choose how much to extract from their private project and the commons. The model compares two types of risk management tool: CPR as risk-coping and risk-diversification mechanisms. It also compares two types of risk: risk on a private project and risk on CPR investment by other community members. The theoretical predictions are empirically tested with experimental economics. In this view, we propose an original CPR game composed of two periods, an investment one and an extraction one. Our result clearly shows that risk reduction in the private project unambiguously decreases investment in the CPR, while it does not impact CPR extraction. We also show that a risk-coping strategy is well understood as more flexible and influenced by the outcome in terms of private project yield.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www6.nancy.inra.fr/lef/Cahiers-du-LEF/2014/2014-06
File Function: First version, 2010
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Laboratoire d'Economie Forestiere, AgroParisTech-INRA in its series Working Papers - Cahiers du LEF with number 2014-06.

as in new window
Length: 28 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2014
Date of revision: Apr 2014
Handle: RePEc:lef:wpaper:2014-06

Contact details of provider:
Postal: 14 rue Girardet, 54042 Nancy cedex
Phone: 33 (0)3 83 39 68 66
Fax: 33 (0)3 83 37 06 45
Email:
Web page: http://www.nancy.inra.fr/lef
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: Common-pool resource; Common-pool resource game; deforestation; experimental economics.;

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

Citations

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:lef:wpaper:2014-06. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Benoit Vandenbroucke).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.