Cooperation, Imitation and Correlated Matching
AbstractWe study a setting where imitative players are matched into pairs to play a Prisoners' Dilemma game. A well know result in such setting is that under random matching cooperation vanishes for any interior initial condition. The novelty of this paper is that we add a certain correlation to the matching process: players that belong to a pair were both parties cooperate repeat partner next period whilst all other players are randomly matched into pairs. This intuitive correlation introduced in the matching process makes cooperation the unique outcome in the long run under some conditions. Furthermore, we show that no assortative equilibrium exits.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, University of Leicester in its series Discussion Papers in Economics with number 09/12.
Date of creation: Jun 2009
Date of revision: Jun 2011
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Postal: Department of Economics University of Leicester, University Road. Leicester. LE1 7RH. UK
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-07-17 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2009-07-17 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2009-07-17 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2009-07-17 (Game Theory)
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