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L'assurance contre les catastrophes en Espagne

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Author Info

  • Thomas VON UNGERN-STERNBERG

Abstract

This paper studies the state building insurance monopoly in Spain, the Consorcio the Compensacion de Seguros. It is shown that, just like its Swiss counterparts, the Consorcio operates with exceptionally low transactions costs. Furthermore it allows the supply of a very low cost insurance cover in a domain, where competition would usually lead to market failure due to problems of adverse selection. The existence of the Consorcio is in contradiction with the 3rd EU guidelines on the insurance market, however Spain managed to get an exemption.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP in its series Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP) with number 9718.

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Length: 20 pages
Date of creation: Dec 1997
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Thomas von Ungern-Sternberg, L'Assurance Immobilière en Europe : les Limites de la Concurrence, Economica, Paris, 2002, pp. 45-62
Handle: RePEc:lau:crdeep:9718

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Postal: Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP, Internef, CH-1015 Lausanne
Phone: ++41 21 692.33.64
Fax: ++41 21 692.33.05
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Web page: http://www.hec.unil.ch/deep/publications/cahiers/series
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Related research

Keywords: catastrophe insurance; state monopoly; adverse selection; Spain; EU-legislation;

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