The paper analyses the problem of optimal liquidity provision in simple continuous-time general-equilibrium model under uncertainty. It argues that liquidity provision is subject to moral-hazard problems due to the unobservebility of households' characteristics and characterizes incentive-compatible deposit contracts as second mechanisms to provide liquidity.
Download Info
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page
whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be
available.
Length: 29 pages Date of creation: Feb 1996 Date of revision: Publication status: Published in Journal of Financial Intermediation, vol. 7 (2), April 1998, pp. 177-197 Handle: RePEc:lau:crdeep:9604
Find related papers by JEL classification: D51 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Exchange and Production Economies D92 - Microeconomics - - Intertemporal Choice and Growth - - - Intertemporal Firm Choice and Growth, Investment, or Financing G20 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - General G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Mortgages
Cited by: (explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)