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Die Übernahme von Denner durch Migros verstösst gegen das Kartellgesetz

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Author Info
Thomas VON UNGERN-STERNBERG
Mario JAMETTI

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Abstract

We investigate whether it is likely that the Swiss competition authority (WEKO) will approve the acquisition of Denner (the number 3 retailer in Switzerland) by Migros (the number 1 retailer). We argue that the decisions made by the European competition authorities are helpful guidelines in this case. We find it likely that the merger will not be approved. Both concentration and barriers to entry in the Swiss retail market are already very high. The takeover of the "third force" by the market leader would eliminate effective competition, both from the perspective of clients and suppliers. It is conceivable that the WEKO might not be willing to fully apply the law, and merely ask Migros to sell a port of Denner's retail network to a foreign competitor.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP in its series Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP) with number 07.02.

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Length: 15 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2007
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:lau:crdeep:07.02

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Postal: Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP, Internef, CH-1015 Lausanne
Phone: ++41 21 692.33.64
Fax: ++41 21 692.33.65
Web page: http://www.hec.unil.ch/deep/publications-english/e-cahiers.htm

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Related research
Keywords: merger retail market concentration barriers to entry

Find related papers by JEL classification:
L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
L81 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Retail and Wholesale Trade; e-Commerce

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