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De l'équilibre au chaos et retour : bilan méthodologique des recherches sur la règle de majorité

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Author Info
SALMON, Pierre () (LATEC - Université de Bourgogne)
WOLFELSPERGER, Alain () (Institut d'études politiques de Paris)

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Abstract

D'après le modèle canonique qui est au coeur de la théorie "économique" (ou "des choix rationnels", comme préfèrent dire les politologues) appliquée à la politique (démocratique), il est, en général, impossible de parvenir à une décision déterminée en recourant à la règle de majorité dès que le sujet en cause comporte au moins deux aspects distincts. Ce problème, dit du déséquilibre ou de l'instabilité de l'équilibre ou, encore du "chaos", d'abord minimisé, a ensuite paru gravement menaçant quant aux chances de développement de l'ensemble de la théorie. Mais à l'inquiétude qu'il suscitait jusqu'aux années quatre-vingt a succédé récemment une sérénité retrouvée grâce à la construction de modèles admettant un équilibre sans pourtant que le problème, dans sa formulation initiale, ait été vraiment résolu. Cet article vise à présenter les grandes lignes de cet aller et retour théorique et à en présenter une interprétation méthodologique à la lumière de certains développements récents de la philosophie des sciences, notamment celui qui assigne à la recherche l'objectif d'identifier les principaux mécanismes à l'oeuvre dans les systèmes sociaux réels plutôt qu'à découvrir des lois empiriques universelles. / According to the canonical model situated at the heart of the " economic " - or, as the political scientists prefer to call it, rational-choice - theory of (democratic) politics, whenever the matter to be decided raises, or consists of, at least two distinct issues, it is generally impossible to reach a determinate decision by using the majority rule. This problem, referred to as that of disequilibrium, equilibrium instability, or even"chaos", was first underplayed and then deemed ominous to the point of seriously undermining the development prospects of the whole theory. However, more recently, the concern it was the source of until the 1980s has given way to a state of renewed confidence. What has allowed this to happen is only the construction of solution-yielding models, without the problem as formulated initially being really solved. This article purports to display the main lines of this theoretical reversal and to present a methodological interpretation of it in the light of recent developments in the philosophy of science - in particular the legitimacy now conceded to a research objective that consists in identifying the main mechanisms at work rather than in discovering universal empirical laws.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by LATEC, Laboratoire d'Analyse et des Techniques EConomiques, CNRS UMR 5118, Université de Bourgogne in its series LATEC - Document de travail - Economie (1991-2003) with number 2000-08.

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Date of creation: Jun 2000
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Publication status: published in Revue Française de Science Politique, juin 2001, vol.51, n°3,p.331-369. (revised version)
Handle: RePEc:lat:lateco:2000-08

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Related research
Keywords: théorie spatiale du vote ; règle de majorité ; instabilité du vote ; spatial theory of voting; majority rule ; voting instability;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
B4 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology

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