A seCure reversion protocol that generates payoffs dominating correlated equilibrium
AbstractWe define the reversion protocol of a voluntarily implementable Bayesian mechanism in which risk-averse players have no incentive to cheat or to deviate from the mediator’s recommendation and that can greatly improve their equilibrium expected payoffs as compared to those generated through coordination applied to the results of an unsatisfactory mediation.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier in its series Working Papers with number 10-11.
Length: 16 pages
Date of creation: Sep 2010
Date of revision: Sep 2010
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