A Fundamental Difficulty Underlying International Harmonization of Competition Policies
AbstractThe international harmonization of competition policies is widely perceived as a prime area for international policy discussion. We demonstrate that this harmonization, unlike a general tariff reduction, cannot be guided by the principle of reciprocity. Towards this end, we build a two-country partial equilibrium model with non-tradable service sectors. The governments play a game in which they choose the degrees of competition in their respective service sectors. In a Nash equilibrium, one country chooses the perfectly competitive policy whereas the other country chooses an imperfectly competitive policy. This equilibrium cannot be transformed into the first best state by the principle of reciprocity.
Download InfoTo our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research in its series KIER Working Papers with number 700.
Date of creation: Mar 2010
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Yoshida-Honmachi, Sakyo-ku, Kyoto 606-8501
Web page: http://www.kier.kyoto-u.ac.jp/eng/index.html
More information through EDIRC
competition policy; international harmonization; reciprocity principle; Nash equilibrium;
Other versions of this item:
- Makoto Yano & Takakazu Honryo, 2011. "Fundamental difficulty underlying international harmonization of competition policies," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 7(1), pages 111-118, 03.
You can help add them by filling out this form.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ryo Okui).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.