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Some Determinants of Insider Power in the Labor Market

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  • : Henrik Lando

    (Institute of Economics, University of Copenhagen)

Abstract

An insider-outsider model is constructed in a non-cooperative bargaining framework. In the model there is one employer and a continuum of workers. A majority of the workers can, by threatening to withdraw from bargaining if the employer enters into bargaining with the remaining workers, exclude those from working. The paper analyzes how the incentive to exclude and the size of the excluding coalition are determined by the shape of the employer's revenue function, by the choice of bargaining solution, and by whether or not there is a rule prohibiting permanent replacement of striking workers.

Suggested Citation

  • : Henrik Lando, "undated". "Some Determinants of Insider Power in the Labor Market," Discussion Papers 93-06, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:kud:kuiedp:9306
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