Subjective Expected Utility Theory with “Small Worlds”
AbstractWe model the notion of a "small world" as a context dependent state space embedded into the "grand world". For each situation the decision maker creates a "small world" reflecting the events perceived to be relevant for the act under consideration. The "grand world" is represented by an event space which is a more general construction than a state space. We retain preference axioms similar in spirit to the Savage axioms and obtain, without abandoning linearity of expectations, a subjective expected utility theory which allows for an intuitive distinction between risk and uncertainty. We also obtain separation of subjective probability and utility as in the state space models.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics in its series Discussion Papers with number 09-26.
Length: 22 pages
Date of creation: Aug 2004
Date of revision: Dec 2009
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subjective expected utility; decision making under uncertainty; uncertainty aversion; Ellsberg paradox;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
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