Leonidas C. Koutsougeras (University of Manchester)
Abstract
For market games which feature multiple posts for each commodity we show the following: (i) the 'law of one price' obtains asymptotically as the number of market participants becomes infinite, irrespectively of the characteristics of market participants; (ii) as the number of markets increases the set of equilibria is nested upwards.
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Paper provided by University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics in its series Discussion Papers with number
02-12.
Length: 23 pages Date of creation: Oct 2002 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:kud:kuiedp:0212
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Find related papers by JEL classification: D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection D50 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - General C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
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