Transparency and Tacit Collusion
AbstractThis paper investigates the effects on tacit collusion of increased market transparency on the consumer side as well as on the producer side of a market. Increasing market transparency on the consumer side, increases the benefits to a firm from undercutting the collusive price. It also decreases the punishment profit (whether the punishment is Nash-reversion or optimal punishment). The net effect is that collusion becomes harder to sustain. Increasing market transparency on the producer side facilitates collusion. When transparency is increased on both sides, the net effect is that collusion becomes harder to sustain.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics in its series CIE Discussion Papers with number 2001-04.
Length: 25 pages
Date of creation: May 2001
Date of revision:
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Transparency; tacit collusion; competition policy; internet;
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- Lommerud, Kjell Erik & Sørgard, Lars, 2002.
"Entry in Telecommunication: Customer Loyalty, Price Sensitivity and Access Prices,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
3502, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Lommerud, Kjell Erik & Sorgard, Lars, 2003. "Entry in telecommunication: customer loyalty, price sensitivity and access prices," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 55-72, March.
- Lommerud, Kjell Erik & Sørgard, Lars, 2002. "Entry in Telecommunication: Customer Loyalty, Price Sensitivity and Access Prices," Working Papers in Economics 14/02, University of Bergen, Department of Economics.
- Helbing, Dirk & Balietti, Stefano, 2011. "Big data, privacy, and trusted web: What needs to be done," MPRA Paper 49702, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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