Noncooperative R&D and Optimal R&D Cartels
AbstractThis paper deals with a general version of a two-stage model of R&D and product market competition. We provide a thorough generalization of previous results on the comparative performance of noncooperative and cooperative R&D, dispensing in particular with ex-post symmetry and linear demand assumptions. We also characterize the structure of optimal R&D cartels where firms competing in a product market jointly decide R&D expenditure, as well as internal spillover, levels. We establish the firms would essentially always prefer extremal spillovers. Within the context of a standard specification, we provide conditions for the optimality of minimal spillover.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics in its series CIE Discussion Papers with number 2000-09.
Length: 33 pages
Date of creation: Dec 2000
Date of revision:
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More information through EDIRC
oligopolistic R&D; Spillovers; research joint ventures; R&D cartel;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- O31 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
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- Suetens, S., 2004.
"Literature review: R&D cooperation in oligopoly with spillovers: An experimental economics approach,"
Open Access publications from Tilburg University
urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-3529827, Tilburg University.
- Suetens S., 2004. "Literature review: R&D cooperation in oligopoly with spill-overs: an experimental economic approach," Working Papers 2004024, University of Antwerp, Faculty of Applied Economics.
- Temimi, Akram & Dakhlia, Sami & Menezes, Flavio Marques, 2001. "Duplication of R D and Industry Concentration," Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 437, FGV/EPGE Escola Brasileira de Economia e Finanças, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil).
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