We investigate whether increased transparency about prices may increase the countervailing power exercised by buyers of an intermediate good and whether this will lead to a decrease of intermediate goods prices. We show that, even in a non-cooperative, one-shot model, the most likely outcome of improved transparency is a price increase: Improved transparency will lead sellers to take tougher bargaining stands since more is at stake. The results are related to the experience of the Danish Competition Authority´s practice in the 1990s.
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Paper provided by University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics in its series CIE Discussion Papers with number
2000-01.
Find related papers by JEL classification: L20 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - General L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
H. Peter Møllgaard & Per Baltzer Overgaard, 1999.
"Market Transparency: A Mixed Blessing?,"
CIE Discussion Papers
1999-15, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics, revised Feb 2000.
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