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Competition Policy: Publicity vs. Prohibition & Punishment

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Author Info
Stephen Martin (Institute of Economics, University of Copenhagen)

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Abstract

The consequences for market performance of publicity of anticompetitive behaviour and prohibition of anticompetitive behaviour combined with punishment of violators are compared, in a model that also allows for the possibility of entry. Implications for Danish and for international competitive policy are drawn.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics in its series CIE Discussion Papers with number 1997-02.

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Length: 36 pages
Date of creation: Feb 1997
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in: Stephen Martin (ed.): Competition Policies in Europe. Elsevier-North Holland Publ., 1998, pp 105-141
Handle: RePEc:kud:kuieci:1997-02

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Postal: Ă˜ster Farimagsgade 5, Building 26, DK-1353 Copenhagen K., Denmark
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Web page: http://www.econ.ku.dk/cie/
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General
L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

Cited by:
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  1. Geoff Bertram & Dan Twaddle, 2005. "Price-Cost Margins and Profit Rates in New Zealand Electricity Distribution Networks Since 1994: the Cost of Light Handed Regulation," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 27(3), pages 281-308, 01. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Verena Hahn, 2000. "Antitrust Enforcement: Abuse Control or Notification?," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 10(1), pages 69-91, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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