The consequences for market performance of publicity of anticompetitive behaviour and prohibition of anticompetitive behaviour combined with punishment of violators are compared, in a model that also allows for the possibility of entry. Implications for Danish and for international competitive policy are drawn.
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Paper provided by University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics in its series CIE Discussion Papers with number
1997-02.
Length: 36 pages Date of creation: Feb 1997 Date of revision: Publication status: Published in: Stephen Martin (ed.): Competition Policies in Europe. Elsevier-North Holland Publ., 1998, pp 105-141 Handle: RePEc:kud:kuieci:1997-02
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Find related papers by JEL classification: L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
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