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Strategy-Proof and Fair Mechanism in Shapley-Scarf Economies

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  • Kazuhiko Hashimoto

    ()

  • Hiroki Saitoh

    ()

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    Abstract

    We study strategy-proof and fair mechanism in Shapley and Scarf (1974) economies. We introduce a new condition for fairness, we call envy-freeness for equal position. It requires that if one agent prefers the otherfs allocation, he should not prefer it to his allocation that is assigned at the situation that we regard as the one their position are exchanged. We show that a mechanism satisfies strategyproofness, individual rationality, envy-freeness for equal position, and non-bossiness if and only if it is either the core mechanism or the no-trade mechanism.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Graduate School of Economics, Kobe University in its series Discussion Papers with number 1110.

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    Length: 15pages
    Date of creation: Jul 2011
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:koe:wpaper:1110

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    Web page: http://www.econ.kobe-u.ac.jp
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