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Risk-Sharing in Village Economies

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Author Info
Tim Worrall

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Abstract

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File URL: http://www.keele.ac.uk/depts/ec/wpapers/9815.pdf
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Paper provided by Department of Economics, Keele University in its series Keele Department of Economics Discussion Papers (1995-2001) with number 98/15.

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Date of creation: 1998
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Handle: RePEc:kee:keeldp:98/15

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Postal: Department of Economics, University of Keele, Keele, Staffordshire, ST5 5BG - United Kingdom
Phone: +44 (0)1782 584581
Fax: +44 (0)1782 717577
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Web page: http://www.keele.ac.uk/depts/ec/cer/
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Postal: Department of Economics, Keele University, Keele, Staffordshire ST5 5BG - United Kingdom
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Web: http://www.keele.ac.uk/depts/ec/cer/pubs_kerps.htm

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Martin E. Diedrich).

Related research
Keywords: limited commitment; risk sharing; village economies;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods and Programming - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
D90 - Microeconomics - - Intertemporal Choice and Growth - - - General
E21 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomics: Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Consumption; Saving; Wealth

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Coate, Stephen & Ravallion, Martin, 1993. "Reciprocity without commitment : Characterization and performance of informal insurance arrangements," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 1-24, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Braverman, Avishay & Guasch, J. Luis, 1986. "Rural credit markets and institutions in developing countries: Lessons for policy analysis from practice and modern theory," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 14(10-11), pages 1253-1267. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Udry, Christopher, 1994. "Risk and Insurance in a Rural Credit Market: An Empirical Investigation in Northern Nigeria," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 61(3), pages 495-526, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Herschel I. Grossman & John B. Van Huyck, 1989. "Sovereign Debt as a Contingent Claim: Excusable Default, Repudiation, and Reputation," NBER Working Papers 1673, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Jonathan Morduch, 1995. "Income Smoothing and Consumption Smoothing," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1727, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
    Other versions:
  6. Hayashi, Fumio & Altonji, Joseph & Kotlikoff, Laurence, 1996. "Risk-Sharing between and within Families," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(2), pages 261-94, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Ethan Ligon & Jonathan P. Thomas & Tim Worrall, 2000. "Mutual Insurance, Individual Savings and Limited Commitment," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 3(2), pages 216-246, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  8. Ravallion, Martin & Dearden, Lorraine, 1988. "Social Security in a "Moral Economy": An Empirical Analysis for Java," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 70(1), pages 36-44, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Ethan Ligon & Jonathan P Thomas & Tim Worrall, 1997. "Informal Insurance Arrangements in Village Economies," CRIEFF Discussion Papers 9705, Centre for Research into Industry, Enterprise, Finance and the Firm.
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  10. Worrall, Tim, 1990. "Debt with potential repudiation," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 34(5), pages 1099-1109, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Thomas, Jonathan & Worrall, Tim, 1988. "Self-enforcing Wage Contracts," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 55(4), pages 541-54, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Pender, John L., 1996. "Discount rates and credit markets: Theory and evidence from rural india," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 257-296, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Townsend, R., 1996. "Micro Enterprise and Macro Policy," Papers 285, Banca Italia - Servizio di Studi.
  14. Martin Ravallion & Shubham Chaudhuri, 1997. "Risk and Insurance in Village India: Comment," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(1), pages 171-184, January.
  15. Fafchamps, Marcel, 1992. "Solidarity Networks in Preindustrial Societies: Rational Peasants with a Moral Economy," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 41(1), pages 147-74, October.
  16. Jacoby, Hanan G & Skoufias, Emmanuel, 1997. "Risk, Financial Markets, and Human Capital in a Developing Country," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 64(3), pages 311-35, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Cochrane, John H, 1991. "A Simple Test of Consumption Insurance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 99(5), pages 957-76, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  18. Mace, Barbara J, 1991. "Full Insurance in the Presence of Aggregate Uncertainty," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 99(5), pages 928-56, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  19. Richard A. Posner, 1979. "A Theory of Primitive Society with Special Reference to Law," University of Chicago - George G. Stigler Center for Study of Economy and State 7, Chicago - Center for Study of Economy and State.
    Other versions:
  20. Kocherlakota, Narayana R, 1996. "Implications of Efficient Risk Sharing without Commitment," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 63(4), pages 595-609, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  21. Abreu, Dilip, 1988. "On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(2), pages 383-96, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  22. Eswaran, Mukesh & Kotwal, Ashok, 1989. "Credit as insurance in agrarian economies," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 37-53, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  23. Hammond, Peter J, 1977. "The Core and Equilibrium through the Looking-Glass," Australian Economic Papers, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 16(29), pages 211-18, December.
  24. Deaton, Angus & Paxson, Christina, 1994. "Intertemporal Choice and Inequality," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(3), pages 437-67, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  25. Andrew D. Foster & Mark R. Rosenzweig, 2001. "Imperfect Commitment, Altruism, And The Family: Evidence From Transfer Behavior In Low-Income Rural Areas," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 83(3), pages 389-407, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  26. Besley, Timothy & Coate, Stephen & Loury, Glenn, 1993. "The Economics of Rotating Savings and Credit Associations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(4), pages 792-810, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  27. Telser, L G, 1980. "A Theory of Self-enforcing Agreements," Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 53(1), pages 27-44, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  28. Beaudry, Paul & DiNardo, John, 1995. "Is the Behavior of Hours Worked Consistent with Implicit Contract Theory?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 110(3), pages 743-68, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  29. Paxson, Christina H, 1992. "Using Weather Variability to Estimate the Response of Savings to Transitory Income in Thailand," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(1), pages 15-33, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  30. Kimball, Miles S, 1988. "Farmers' Cooperatives as Behavior Toward Risk," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(1), pages 224-32, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  31. Thomas, Jonathan & Worrall, Tim, 1990. "Income fluctuation and asymmetric information: An example of a repeated principal-agent problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 367-390, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  32. Kletzer, Kenneth M, 1984. "Asymmetries of Information and LDC Borrowing with Sovereign Risk," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 94(374), pages 287-307, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  33. Townsend, Robert M, 1994. "Risk and Insurance in Village India," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(3), pages 539-91, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
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