The purpose of this paper is to analyze the existence of efficient and envyfree allocations of a single good i,n the presence of consumption externalities. A theoretical model is first developed and an application to the problem of financing Regional Governments in Spain, is then provided. Este trabajo se refiere a un problema de distribución puro, consistente en buscar fórmulas "justas" de repartir una cantidad dada de un bien perfectamente divisible. En primer lugar se plantea un modelo teórico en el que se analiza la existencia de distribuciones eficientes y libres de envidia en un contexto caracterizado por la presencia de externalidades. Posteriormente se desarrolla una aplicación de estos resultados teóricos al problema de la financiación de las Comunidades Autónomas.
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Paper provided by Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie) in its series Working Papers. Serie EC with number
1991-12.
Length: 48 pages Date of creation: Jan 1991 Date of revision: Publication status: Published by Ivie Handle: RePEc:ivi:wpasec:1991-12
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