This paper deals with the problem of fiscal corresponsability of twogovemment levels in a game theory context. It is assumed that Nash equilibriaof the non-cooperative game between both Govemments are not Pareto optimal.Then, assurning the existence of non-equilibrium strategies, which would allowboth of them to improve, it is questioned whether the introduction ofinterposed agents (Tax Agencies) would be a way of getting the necessaryincentives for cooperation. Two results are proved. If each govemment createsits own Tax Agency, results replicate the ones derived from the initial game.Yet, if a Common Tax Agency is created, it behaves as an indirect mechanism,which allows the emergence of cooperation as an equilibrium of this newgame En este trabajo se plantea el problema de la corresponsabilización fiscalde dos niveles de gobierno en un contexto de teoría de juegos. En primer lugarse supone que los equilibrios Nash del juego no-cooperativo entre ambosGobiernos no son Pareto óptimos. En el supuesto de que existan estrategias, node equilibrio, que permitan mejorar a ambos, se plantea la pregunta de si lacreación de agentes interpuestos (Agencia Recaudadoras) sería una forma deconseguir los incentivos necesarios para la cooperación. Se demuestran dosresultados. Si cada gobierno crea una Agencia Recaudadora particular losresultados no varían respecto al juego inicial entre los gobiernos. Pero, síse crea una Agencia Recaudadora Común, ésta actúa como un mecanismo indirectoque posibilita la emergencia de cooperación como equilibrio de este nuevojuego.
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Paper provided by Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie) in its series Working Papers. Serie EC with number
1991-09.
Length: 30 pages Date of creation: Jan 1991 Date of revision: Publication status: Published by Ivie Handle: RePEc:ivi:wpasec:1991-09
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