Strategy-Proof Mechanisms With Private And Public Goods
AbstractIn this paper we develop a differentiable approach to deal with incentives in a, possibly small, subset of a general domain of preferences in economies with one public and one private good. We show that, for two agents, there is no social rule which is efficient, nondictatorial and strategy-proof. For the case of more agents the same result occurs when nondictatorship is replaced by Individual Rationality or by Envy-Freeness. Journal of Economic Literature
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie) in its series Working Papers. Serie AD with number 2004-29.
Length: 19 pages
Date of creation: Aug 2004
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published by Ivie
Strategy-proofness; public goods economies; differentiable mechanisms;
Other versions of this item:
- Rueda-Llano, José & Corchón, Luis C., . "Strategy-Proof Mechanisms With Private And Public Goods," Open Access publications from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid info:hdl:10016/3820, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid.
- D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2006-02-19 (All new papers)
- NEP-MIC-2006-02-19 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-PBE-2006-02-19 (Public Economics)
- NEP-PUB-2006-02-19 (Public Finance)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Saijo, Tatsuyoshi, 1991. "Incentive compatibility and individual rationality in public good economies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 203-212, October.
- Conley, John P. & Diamantaras, Dimitrios, 1996. "Generalized Samuelson conditions and welfare theorems for nonsmooth economies," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 137-152, January.
- Campbell, Donald E. & Truchon, Michel, 1988. "Boundary optima and the theory of public goods supply," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(2), pages 241-249, March.
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