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Strategy-Proof Mechanisms With Private And Public Goods

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Author Info
José Rueda-Llano () (Universidad de Alicante)
Luis Corchón () (Universidad de Alicante)

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Abstract

In this paper we develop a differentiable approach to deal with incentives in a, possibly small, subset of a general domain of preferences in economies with one public and one private good. We show that, for two agents, there is no social rule which is efficient, nondictatorial and strategy-proof. For the case of more agents the same result occurs when nondictatorship is replaced by Individual Rationality or by Envy-Freeness. Journal of Economic Literature

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File URL: http://www.ivie.es/downloads/docs/wpasad/wpasad-2004-29.pdf
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File Function: Fisrt version / Primera version, 2004
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie) in its series Working Papers. Serie AD with number 2004-29.

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Length: 19 pages
Date of creation: Aug 2004
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Publication status: Published by Ivie
Handle: RePEc:ivi:wpasad:2004-29

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Related research
Keywords: Strategy-proofness public goods economies differentiable mechanisms

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation
H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

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This page was last updated on 2008-9-30.

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