In this paper we study the effects of a change in some exogenous variable (the number of players or a parameter in the payoff functions) on the strategies played and payoffs obtained in a Nash Equilibrium in the framework of a Market Game (a generalization of the Cournot model). We assume a strong concavity condition which implies that the best reply function of any player is decreasing on sum of the strategies of the remaining players (i.e. strategic substitution). Our results generalize and unify those known in the Cournot model.
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Paper provided by Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie) in its series Working Papers. Serie AD with number
1993-08.
Length: 38 pages Date of creation: Jul 1993 Date of revision: Publication status: Published by Ivie Handle: RePEc:ivi:wpasad:1993-08
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