Principal-Agent Theory and Nonprofit Accountability
AbstractThis synthetic literature review briefly summarizes general literature on principalagent problems, then shows how this literature has been or can be adapted to look at nonprofit governance, accountability, and performance. It concludes with discussions of differences between agency problems in the for-profit and nonprofit sectors and difficulties in developing normative theories of accountability.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number wp200803.
Length: 71 pages
Date of creation: Feb 2008
Date of revision:
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Principal Agent theory; Contract Failure; Nonprofit Organizations; Privately-Provided Public Good; Fundraising; Donations; Incentive Compensation;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
- L30 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - General
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
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