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Principal-Agent Theory and Nonprofit Accountability

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Author Info
Richard Steinberg () (Department of Economics, Indiana Unviersity-Purdue University Indianapolis)

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Abstract

This synthetic literature review briefly summarizes general literature on principalagent problems, then shows how this literature has been or can be adapted to look at nonprofit governance, accountability, and performance. It concludes with discussions of differences between agency problems in the for-profit and nonprofit sectors and difficulties in developing normative theories of accountability.

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File URL: http://www.iupui.edu/~econ/workingpapers/wp200803.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number wp200803.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length: 71 pages
Date of creation: Feb 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:iup:wpaper:wp200803

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Related research
Keywords: Principal Agent theory; Contract Failure; Nonprofit Organizations; Privately-Provided Public Good; Fundraising; Donations; Incentive Compensation;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
L30 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - General
H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

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This page was last updated on 2009-11-10.

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