Current historiography on the European decolonization processes has developed no general theory of these processes, but is rather a collection of case-based studies. Moreover, there is no consideration for counter-factual possibilities, including the analysis of those cases where independence has not occurred. In this paper we aim at constructing a rational theory approach to decolonization that can encompass the majority of historical cases. Our rational theory is constructed by considering the possible convergence, or divergence, of interests between central and local administrations, and the weight that each carries in the decolonization decision-making process. Our theory predicts that a high value colony will be more likely to experience a colonial war, whereas a low value colony is more likely to achieve independence in a peaceful manner. This observation has to be definned once we allow for the existence of a domestic: game between haw (pro-colonialism) and daves (pro-independence). We then study the strategic relations between the two players, native political organizations and the colonial power, and the domestic outcome.
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Paper provided by Department of Economics at the School of Economics and Management (ISEG), Technical University of Lisbon. in its series Working Papers with number
2001/02.
Length: Date of creation: 2001 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:ise:isegwp:wp22001
Contact details of provider: Postal: Department of Economics, School of Economics and Management (ISEG), Technical University of Lisbon, Rua do Quelhas 6, 1200-781 LISBON, PORTUGAL Web page: http://www.iseg.utl.pt/departamentos/economia/
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