We consider an infinitely-repeated oligopoly in which at each period firms not only serve the spot market by either competing in prices or quantities but also have the opportunity to trade forward contracts. Contrary to the pro-competitive results of finite-horizon models, we find that the possibility of forward trading allows firms to sustain collusive profits that otherwise would not be possible. The result holds both for price and quantity competition and follows because (collusive) contracting of future sales is more effective in deterring deviations from the collusive plan than in inducing the previously identified pro-competitive effects.
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Paper provided by Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile. in its series Documentos de Trabajo with number
271.
Length: Date of creation: 2004 Date of revision: Publication status: Published as "Forward Trading and Collusion in Oligopoly", Journal of Economic Theory, 2006. Handle: RePEc:ioe:doctra:271
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Find related papers by JEL classification: G13 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Contingent Pricing; Futures Pricing L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets L50 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - General
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