In this article, we deal with the topic of intentional information spillover using a model in which both informational- and payoff-externalities are present and the timing of agents' actions is endogenous. In this model, three players, who are heterogeneous in the quality of their information, compete with one another in a common task. According to the results, the weakly-informed players may voluntarily relinquish an option to wait, although no cost is imposed for a delay of action. When acting without a delay, they reveal their information with the hope that others will imitate them. This type of information spillover is due to their incentive, which is to make use of the relative performance evaluation structure under which a bad reputation can be shared if others are also wrong.
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Paper provided by Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research, Economics Department, Indiana University Bloomington in its series Caepr Working Papers with number
2007-011.
Find related papers by JEL classification: D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information
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