Voluntary Contributions to a Public Good When Partial Contribution is a Dominant Strategy
AbstractWe present an experiment on voluntary contributions to a public good. The game has a dominant strategy solution in the interior of the strategy space. In the experiment we observe significant over-contribution. This result is similar to those of the typical corner solution experiments.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Institute for Advanced Studies in its series Economics Series with number 3.
Length: 13 pages
Date of creation: Jan 1995
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
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