. In this paper we examine the vote over income tax schedules in a society in which individuals may have various degrees of altruism. Specifically, we study whether the conjecture that societies where individuals feel concern for each other are more favorable to income redistribution than societies made of egoistic individuales is true. In this respect, we set up a simple and plausible model in which altruistic individuals turn out to unanimously oppose tax increases.
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Paper provided by Instituto de Estudios Fiscales in its series Working Papers with number
31-02 Classification-JEL :.