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The Ambiguous Case for Letting Regulators Tailor Standards

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Abstract

Restrictions preventing regulators from setting standards on a firm by firm basis are commonly assumed to be inefficient. Existing rationales for their prevalence have been politico-economic. We provide an efficiency interpretation. We characterise settings in which the requirement that firms be treated equally is (a) definitely desirable (b) definitely undesirable and (c) where the case is ambiguous.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London in its series Royal Holloway, University of London: Discussion Papers in Economics with number 99/10.

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Length: pages
Date of creation: Feb 2000
Date of revision: Feb 2000
Handle: RePEc:hol:holodi:9910

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