This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

The Allocation of the US Federal Budget to the States: Evidence on the Power of the Purse

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Valentino Larcinese (London School of Economics and Political Science, Department of Government and STICERD)
Leonzio Rizzo (Universita’ di Ferrara, Department of Economics)
Cecilia Testa () (Department of Economics, Royal Holloway, University of London)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

This paper provides new evidence on the determinants of the allocation of the US federal budget to the states. We find that the president has a strong influence on the budget allocation, while support for theories that give prominence to the Congress is rather weak. Membership of prestige committees is not used to divert federal spending nor does membership of the Armed Services committee affects defense spending. The presidential race matters. States that are historically volatile or extremely safe in presidential elections tend to receive more funds, while marginal states are not rewarded. Finally, we find good evidence in support of partisan theories. states whose governor has the same political affiliation of the president receive more federal funds, while states opposing the president’s party in Congressional elections are penalized.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help file. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.rhul.ac.uk/economics/Research/WorkingPapers/pdf/dpe0425.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London in its series Royal Holloway, University of London: Discussion Papers in Economics with number 04/25.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Length: 34 pages
Date of creation: Oct 2004
Date of revision: Oct 2004
Handle: RePEc:hol:holodi:0425

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Egham Hill, Egham, Surrey, TW20 0EX, UK.
Phone: +44 1784-414228
Fax: +44 1784-439534
Web page: http://www.rhul.ac.uk/economics/

Order Information:
Postal: Egham Hill, Egham, Surrey, TW20 0EX, UK.
Email:

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Claire Blackman).

Related research
Keywords: Federal Budget Pork-Barrell President Congress Political Parties Committees American Elections.

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation
H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
H60 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - General
H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
H50 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - General

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Levitt, Steven D & Poterba, James M, 1999. " Congressional Distributive Politics and State Economic Performance," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 99(1-2), pages 185-216, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Wright, Gavin, 1974. "The Political Economy of New Deal Spending: An Econometric Analysis," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 56(1), pages 30-38, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. McCubbins, Mathew D & Noll, Roger G & Weingast, Barry R, 1987. "Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 3(2), pages 243-77, Fall.
  4. Lindbeck, Assar & Weibull, Jorgen W., 1993. "A model of political equilibrium in a representative democracy," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 195-209, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Dahlberg, M. & Johansson, E., 1999. "On the Vote Purchasing Behavior of Incumbent Governments," Papers 1999:24, Uppsala - Working Paper Series.
    Other versions:
  6. Levitt, Steven D & Snyder, James M, Jr, 1997. "The Impact of Federal Spending on House Election Outcomes," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(1), pages 30-53, February.
    Other versions:
  7. Alvarez, R Michael & Saving, Jason L, 1997. " Congressional Committees and the Political Economy of Federal Outlays," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 92(1-2), pages 55-73, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? RePEc and its associated services are free for contributors and users, and do not accept any advertising.

This page was last updated on 2008-6-27.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.