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Legislature Size, Bicameralism and Government Spending:Evidence from Democratic Countries Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Roberto Ricciuti () (Department of Economics, Royal Holloway, University of London )
In this paper we study the relationship between legislature size with respect to general government and welfare spending. According to the theory, legislature size has an indefinite effect on government spending because logrolling and transaction costs have canceling effects. Bicameralism is expected to have a negative effect because of the increased transaction cost of finding a viable majority in two houses with different constituencies. We use a cross-section of 75 countries over the period 1990-1998 controlling for some institutional features that differ among countries. We find that both legislature size and bicameralism do not have a significant effect on the two types of spending.
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Paper provided by Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London in its series Royal Holloway, University of London: Discussion Papers in Economics with number
04/08.
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Length: 25 pages
Date of creation: Jun 2004Date of revision:
Jun 2004Handle: RePEc:hol:holodi:0408Contact details of provider: Postal: Egham Hill, Egham, Surrey, TW20 0EX, UK. Phone: +44 1784-414228 Fax: +44 1784-439534 Web page: http://www.rhul.ac.uk/economics/
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Keywords: legislature size ; bicameralism ; interest groups ; government spending. ; Find related papers by JEL classification: H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports :
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: Daniel Diermeier & Roger B. Myerson, 1999.
"Bicameralism and Its Consequences for the Internal Organization of Legislatures ,"
American Economic Review ,
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[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti & Roberto Perotti & Massimo Rostagno, 2002.
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The Quarterly Journal of Economics ,
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[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Avinash Dixit & Gene M. Grossman & Faruk Gul, 2000.
"The Dynamics of Political Compromise ,"
Journal of Political Economy ,
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[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Bradbury, John Charles & Crain, W. Mark, 2001.
"Legislative organization and government spending: cross-country evidence ,"
Journal of Public Economics ,
Elsevier, vol. 82(3), pages 309-325, December.
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Weingast, Barry R & Shepsle, Kenneth A & Johnsen, Christopher, 1981.
"The Political Economy of Benefits and Costs: A Neoclassical Approach to Distributive Politics ,"
Journal of Political Economy ,
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John Charles Bradbury & W. Mark Crain, 2002.
"Bicameral Legislatures and Fiscal Policy ,"
Southern Economic Journal ,
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Gilligan, Thomas W & Matsusaka, John G, 1995.
"Deviations from Constituent Interests: The Role of Legislative Structure and Political Parties in the States ,"
Economic Inquiry ,
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Dani Rodrik, 1998.
"Why Do More Open Economies Have Bigger Governments? ,"
Journal of Political Economy ,
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Other versions: Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, 2005.
"The Economic Effects of Constitutions ,"
MIT Press Books ,
The MIT Press,
edition 1, volume 1, number 0262661926, December.
Matsusaka, John G, 1995.
"Fiscal Effects of the Voter Initiative: Evidence from the Last 30 Years ,"
Journal of Political Economy ,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(3), pages 587-623, June.
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