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A Look at Learning Models in Three-by-Three Bimatrix Games

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Abstract

Experimental data is used to test a variety of learning models using a model that extends several of the existing learning models. Generally, the parameter estimate are in the expected ranges. Individual agent parameter estimates indicate that there is considerable individual heterogeneity. Representative agent parameter estimates adequately predict the mode of the individual parameter estimates when the data is pooled across matrices. They are not very effective at predicting the mode of the disaggregated data. There is some evidence in favour of the restriction that the two discounts are equal. The restrictions that the agents equally weigh actions experienced and actions not experienced is rejected using both representative agent and individual agent parameter estimates) thought there is evidence that subjects put more weight on actions experienced over those not experienced). We reject the rote learning version of the model in favour of a (weak) belief learning parameterizations of the model.

Suggested Citation

  • Nicole Marie Bouchez, 2001. "A Look at Learning Models in Three-by-Three Bimatrix Games," Royal Holloway, University of London: Discussion Papers in Economics 00/4, Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London, revised Feb 2001.
  • Handle: RePEc:hol:holodi:0004
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Learning; Beliefs; Reinforcement.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

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