By rejecting government's bailout requests, the Bank of Japan knowingly caused a banking panic and cabinet change in 1927. The central bank was neither acting as a political agent, nor trying to deal with moral hazards. The refusal was to sustain monetary contraction aimed at lifiting gold embargo, an objective deemed urgent as Japan had been left as the only major off-gold country. The instability of party politics and organizational growth made the central bank sufficiently autonomous to defy the finance ministry.
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Paper provided by Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University in its series Discussion Paper Series with number
a408.
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Find related papers by JEL classification: E5 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit N1 - Economic History - - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics; Growth and Fluctuations N2 - Economic History - - Financial Markets and Institutions