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Voluntary Participation in a Mechanism Implementing a Public Project

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Author Info
Shinohara, Ryusuke
Abstract

In this study, a participation game in a mechanism to implement a public project is considered; in this game, agents decide simultaneously whether they will participate in the mechanism or not. We characterize the sets of participants at strict Nash equilibria, strong equilibria, and coalition-proof equilibria of the participation game. The three sets of equilibria are shown to coincide and exist. All the equilibrium allocations are Pareto efficient at any one of three notions of equilibria. However, if the public good can be provided in multiple units or if there are multiple projects, then these sets may fail to coincide.

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File URL: http://hermes-ir.lib.hit-u.ac.jp/rs/bitstream/10086/17000/1/070econDP04-14.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University in its series Discussion Papers with number 2004-14.

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Length: 27 p.
Date of creation: Mar 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hit:econdp:2004-14

Note: March 18, 2005 (First Version: July 2003)
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Phone: +81-42-580-8000
Web page: http://www.econ.hit-u.ac.jp/
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Related research
Keywords: Participation game; Public project; Strong equilibrium; Coalition-proof equilibrium; Multi-unit public good; Multiple projects;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

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This page was last updated on 2009-12-20.

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