Environmental policy negotiations, transboundary pollution and lobby groups in small open economies
AbstractThis paper analyzes the consequences of lobby group activity for policy outcomes in economies with transboundary pollution and international environmental policies. In our framework, international environmental policies are characterized as pollution taxes determined in a negotiation between two countries. We find, among other things, that the presence of local lobbying tends to reduce the level of pollution taxes. We also find that an increase in the environmental concern (i.e. stronger preferences for a clean environment) may reduce the pollution tax in both countries. It is also possible that increased environmental concern in one country reduces the pollution tax in the other country.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Umeå University, Department of Economics in its series Umeå Economic Studies with number 722.
Length: 29 pages
Date of creation: 02 Nov 2007
Date of revision: 01 Jul 2008
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Department of Economics, Umeå University, S-901 87 Umeå, Sweden
Phone: 090 - 786 61 42
Fax: 090 - 77 23 02
Web page: http://www.econ.umu.se/
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transboundary pollution; lobbying; taxes; pollution; Nash bargain; negotiations; environmental policy;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
- F18 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade and Environment
- H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
- H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
- H70 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-11-10 (All new papers)
- NEP-ENE-2007-11-10 (Energy Economics)
- NEP-ENV-2007-11-10 (Environmental Economics)
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