Persson, Lars () (Department of Economics, Umeå University)
Abstract
This paper analyzes the consequences of lobby group activity for policy outcomes in economies with transboundary pollution and international environmental policies. In our framework, international environmental policies are characterized as pollution taxes determined in a negotiation between two countries. We find, among other things, that the presence of local lobbying tends to reduce the level of pollution taxes. We also find that an increase in the environmental concern (i.e. stronger preferences for a clean environment) may reduce the pollution tax in both countries. It is also possible that increased environmental concern in one country reduces the pollution tax in the other country.
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Umeå University, Department of Economics in its series Umeå Economic Studies with number
722.
Length: 29 pages Date of creation: 02 Nov 2007 Date of revision:
01 Jul 2008 Handle: RePEc:hhs:umnees:0722
Contact details of provider: Postal: Department of Economics, Umeå University, S-901 87 Umeå, Sweden Phone: 090 - 786 61 42 Fax: 090 - 77 23 02 Email: Web page: http://www.econ.umu.se/ More information through EDIRC
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