Fiscal Externalities and Asymmetric Information in an Economic Federation
AbstractThis paper analyzes optimal taxation and provision of public goods in an economy where tax and expenditure decisions are being made by both central and local governments. The main contribution of the paper is to address the implications of informational asymmetries, such that the central government cannot fully observe differences in local preferences. In case the differences across localities only refer to their preferences for local public goods, we show how the central government can implement the socially optimal resource allocation by means of subsidizing local provision of the federal (or central) public good. We also examine the welfare effects of such subsidies, when the socially optimal resource allocation is not a feasible policy option.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Umeå University, Department of Economics in its series Umeå Economic Studies with number 516.
Length: 20 pages
Date of creation: 15 Oct 1999
Date of revision:
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Postal: Department of Economics, Umeå University, S-901 87 Umeå, Sweden
Phone: 090 - 786 61 42
Fax: 090 - 77 23 02
Web page: http://www.econ.umu.se/
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Fiscal externalities; informational asymmetries: optimal taxation and provision of public goods;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
- D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
- H71 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
- H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
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- Linda Andersson & Thomas Aronsson & Magnus Wikstr–m, 2004.
"Testing for Vertical Fiscal Externalities,"
International Tax and Public Finance, Springer,
Springer, vol. 11(3), pages 243-263, 05.
- Andersson, Linda & Aronsson, Thomas & Wikström, Magnus, 2001. "Testing for Vertical Fiscal Externalities," UmeÃ¥ Economic Studies, UmeÃ¥ University, Department of Economics 573, Umeå University, Department of Economics.
- Aronsson, Thomas & Wikström, Magnus, 2001. "Optimal Taxation and Risk-Sharing Arrangements in an Economic Federation," UmeÃ¥ Economic Studies, UmeÃ¥ University, Department of Economics 538, Umeå University, Department of Economics.
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