The Role of Proactive Adaptation in International Climate Change Mitigation Agreements
AbstractThis paper investigates the role of proactive adaptation in international mitigation coalition formation. Adaptation is introduced into a three stage cartel game of coalition formation. We analytically derive the optimal level of mitigation and proactive adaptation for the singletons and coalition members. We introduce the AD-STACO model which is constructed based on the STACO model, which is an applied three-stage cartel formation model with 12 heterogenous regions. Simulating all possible coalitions (4084) and checking for internal and external stability, we investigate how different levels of proactive adaptation will affect the payoffs in Grand coalition and the incentives to freeride. We examine which stable coalitions are found with different levels of proactive adaptation and whether regions can gain from overadaptation in the best performing stable coalition. We find that though payoffs increase in the Grand coalition with lower adaptation, incentives to leave increase. Coalition members can increase their payoffs through overadaptation.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by CERE - the Center for Environmental and Resource Economics in its series CERE Working Papers with number 2011:9.
Length: 24 pages
Date of creation: 27 May 2011
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Web page: http://www.cere.se
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-06-04 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2011-06-04 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-ENE-2011-06-04 (Energy Economics)
- NEP-ENV-2011-06-04 (Environmental Economics)
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- Heuson, Clemens & Gawel, Erik & Gebhardt, Oliver & Hansjürgens, Bernd & Lehmann, Paul & Meyer, Volker & Schwarze, Reimund, 2012. "Ökonomische Grundfragen der Klimaanpassung: Umrisse eines neuen Forschungsprogramms," UFZ Reports 02/2012, Helmholtz Centre for Environmental Research (UFZ).
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- Oberlack, Christoph & Neumärker, Bernhard, 2011. "Economics, institutions and adaptation to climate change," The Constitutional Economics Network Working Papers 04-2011, University of Freiburg, Department of Economic Policy and Constitutional Economic Theory.
- repec:old:wpaper:344 is not listed on IDEAS
- Klaus Eisenack & Leonhard Kähler, 2012. "Unilateral emission reductions can lead to Pareto improvements when adaptation to damages is possible," Working Papers V-344-12, University of Oldenburg, Department of Economics, revised Jan 2012.
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