Pareto-Efficient Climate Agreements Can Always Be Renegotiation-Proof
AbstractRecent contributions show that climate agreements with broad participation can be implemented as weakly renegotiation-proof equilibria in simple models of greenhouse gas abatement where each country has a binary choice between cooperating (i.e., abate emissions) or defecting (no abatement). Here we show that this result carries over to a model where countries have a continuum of emission choices. Indeed, a Pareto-efficient climate agreement can always be implemented as a weakly renegotiation-proof equilibrium, for a sufficiently high discount factor. This means that one need not trade-off a “narrow but deep” treaty with a “broad but shallow” treaty.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Oslo University, Department of Economics in its series Memorandum with number 23/2008.
Length: 22 pages
Date of creation: 12 Aug 2008
Date of revision:
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Postal: Department of Economics, University of Oslo, P.O Box 1095 Blindern, N-0317 Oslo, Norway
Phone: 22 85 51 27
Fax: 22 85 50 35
Web page: http://www.oekonomi.uio.no/indexe.html
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Climate agreements; Pareto-effiency; greenhouse gases;
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- A10 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-02-14 (All new papers)
- NEP-ENE-2009-02-14 (Energy Economics)
- NEP-ENV-2009-02-14 (Environmental Economics)
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