OPEC's Response to International Climate Agreements
AbstractThis paper studies a game between a group of countries that have agreed to participate in an international climate agreement ( the signatories) and OPEC. The purpose of the signatories is to design carbon taxes that maximize their total net income, given a goal on global carbon emissions. As response to the agreement, OPEC imposes an oil tax on itd members states that maximizes OPEC's profits.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Oslo University, Department of Economics in its series Memorandum with number 10/1996.
Length: 23 pages
Date of creation: 1996
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Department of Economics, University of Oslo, P.O Box 1095 Blindern, N-0317 Oslo, Norway
Phone: 22 85 51 27
Fax: 22 85 50 35
Web page: http://www.oekonomi.uio.no/indexe.html
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NATURAL RESOURCES; CLIMAT; AIR POLLUTION;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- L71 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Primary Products and Construction - - - Mining, Extraction, and Refining: Hydrocarbon Fuels
- Q20 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - General
- Q25 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Water
- H3 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents
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