Strategic Saving and Non-Negative Gifts
AbstractO'Connell and Zeldes (1993) have shown that the dynamic inefficiency result of a standard gift model is reversed if parents can undersave strategically. I impose an explicit non-negativity constraint on gifts, which - for all numerical examples suggested by O'Connell and Zeldes - alters this result, by making gifts non-operative. However, for other realistic numerical examples, this is not the case.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies in its series Seminar Papers with number 624.
Length: 20 pages
Date of creation: 31 Oct 1997
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Institute for International Economic Studies, Stockholm University, S-106 91 Stockholm, Sweden
Web page: http://www.iies.su.se/
More information through EDIRC
Dynamic efficiency; Altruism; Gifts; Overlapping generations; Saving;
Other versions of this item:
- D91 - Microeconomics - - Intertemporal Choice - - - Intertemporal Household Choice; Life Cycle Models and Saving
- H31 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Household
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