Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

How (Good) Immigration is: a matching analysis

Contents:

Author Info

  • Ortega, Javier

    (Departement d'Economia, Universitat Pompeu Fabra)

Abstract

We present a dynamic two-country labour matching economy. Workers decide whether to search in their native country (paying a small cost) or to look for a job abroad (bearing an additional cost). Firms choose the number of vacancies they post in each country according to the average workers' characteristics inside it. Wages are determined in an individual Nash bargaining. We show the existence of multiple steady-state equilibria : a no-migration equilibrium and two migration equilibria. The multiplicity of equilibria comes from a self-fulfilling prophecy phenomenon linking average wages and incentives to migration. The equilibria are Pareto-ranked, with migration-equilibria dominating no-migration.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://su.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:343144/FULLTEXT01
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies in its series Seminar Papers with number 618.

as in new window
Length: 30 pages
Date of creation: 30 Oct 1997
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Economic Journal, 2000, pages 1-21.
Handle: RePEc:hhs:iiessp:0618

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Institute for International Economic Studies, Stockholm University, S-106 91 Stockholm, Sweden
Phone: +46-8-162000
Fax: +46-8-161443
Web page: http://www.iies.su.se/
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: immmigration; migration; labour; Nash bargaining; multiple steady-state equilibria; Pareto efficiency;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

Citations

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hhs:iiessp:0618

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Mounir Karadja) or (Niels-Jakob Harbo Hansen) or (Erik Prawitz).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.