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Epistemic robustness of sets closed under rational behavior

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Author Info
Asheim, Geir (Dept. of Economics, University of Oslo)
Voorneveld, Mark () (Dept. of Economics, Stockholm School of Economics)
Weibull, Jörgen W. (Dept. of Economics, Stockholm School of Economics)

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Abstract

This paper provides two conditions of epistemic robustness, robustness to alternative best replies and robustness to non-best replies, and uses them to characterize variants of curb sets in finite games, including the set of rationalizable strategies.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Stockholm School of Economics in its series Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance with number 714.

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Length: 16 pages
Date of creation: 30 Mar 2009
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hhs:hastef:0714

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Related research
Keywords: epistemic game theory; epistemic robustness; rationalizability; closedness under rational behavior; mutual p-belief;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

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This page was last updated on 2009-11-28.

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