Delegation of Bargaining and Power
AbstractTwo principals simultaneously appoint one agent each and decide how much power to give to their agents. The agents' task is to bargain over the provision of a public good. Power here means the right to decide the own side's provision if negotiations break down. In equilibrium the principals delegate to agents that are relatively disinterested in the public good and give them all power. The fact that both principals have the possibility to delegate is, in equilibrium, harmful to at least one of them. The equilibrium may even be Pareto dominated by the outcome under autarchy.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Stockholm School of Economics in its series Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance with number 248.
Length: 20 pages
Date of creation: 31 Aug 1998
Date of revision:
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Strategic delegation; bargaining; disagreement; power.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-1998-09-07 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-1998-09-07 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-GTH-1998-09-07 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-1998-09-07 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-POL-1998-09-07 (Positive Political Economics)
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- Robert A.J. Dur & Hein J. Roelfsema, 2002. "Why does Centralisation fail to internalise Policy Externalities?," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 02-056/3, Tinbergen Institute, revised 11 Nov 2003.
- Robert Dur & Hein Roelfsema, 2004.
"Why does Centralisation Fail to Internalise Policy Externalities?,"
04-09, Utrecht School of Economics.
- Robert Dur & Hein Roelfsema, 2005. "Why does centralisation fail to internalise policy externalities?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 122(3), pages 395-416, March.
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