This paper analyzes the effects of mixed public-private R&D incentives and empirically tests whether patents that were publicly sponsored are more important than non-subsidized ones. Blending patents and public subsidies will allow the funding agency to subsidize inventions that would otherwise not elicit investment because the private incentive will not fully cover the cost of the invention. Thus, the policy maker will only subsidize inventions that have a high social value. The empirical analysis shows that subsidized inventions result in more important patents, as measured by the number of forward citations.
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Copenhagen Business School, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number
06-2008.
Length: 21 pages Date of creation: 01 Jan 2008 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:hhs:cbsnow:2008_006
Contact details of provider: Postal: Department of Economics, Copenhagen Business School, Solbjerg Plads 3 C, 5. sal, DK-2000 Frederiksberg, Denmark Phone: 38 15 25 75 Fax: 38 15 26 65 Email: Web page: http://www.cbs.dk/departments/econ/ More information through EDIRC
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